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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The construction unions' crisis both preceded and contributed to the general decline of 
organized labor. At the time "concessions" became a household word in manufacturing, building trades 
workers had already endured five years of wage freezes and cuts. Just as construction unions helped set 
standards in the past for wages, hours and political muscle for the entire labor movement, the rise of the 
open shop in construction was the opening salvo of an all-out assault on the house of labor in the 1970s 
and '80s. 
Since World War II, building trades unions generally marched to their own tune, cementing their power 
locally and nationally, and often appearing indifferent to the fate of other sectors of the workforce. But 
their current crisis has evaporated the reigning sense of complacency and has forced union leaders to 
reconsider adopting the traditions of militancy and activism that built their organizations a hundred years 
ago. Drawing on some of the recent innovations throughout the labor movement, building trades unions 
are currently more receptive to new initiatives than at any time in the past 50 years. 
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Overview 
Who 
Will Build 
the Future? 
\Mark Erlich 
Twenty years ago union construction workers were responsible 
for 80% of all construction activity in the United States. Outside 
of rural, residential and small-scale commercial projects, virtually 
all ironworkers, carpenters, electricians, plumbers, painters and 
other craft workers on construction sites across the country carried 
union cards. 
Today just 30-35% of the construction dollar involves union 
workers. The uneven but forward progress of a century of union-
building in construction has been reversed. Organized workers 
now represent only 22% of the total construction workforce. 
Aided by some of the nation's most powerful corporations, open 
shop contractors have emerged as a potent economic and political 
force undermining trade unionism. The Associated Builders and 
Contractors (ABC), once an insignificant haven for nonunion 
homebuilders and marginal commercial firms, has grown from 
17 chapters and 3,000 members in 1970 to 75 chapters with 20,000 
members today. The ABC can now advance a sophisticated anti-
union political agenda, and its members participate at every level 
» Mark Erlich is a member of Carpenters Local 40 in Boston. He is the author 
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of the construction market. Fluor Daniel, Brown & Root, BE&K, 
Blount and other nonunion giants bid on and build megaprojects 
on a national and international scale. 
The war is by no means over, but the open shop clearly won 
the battle of the 1970s and early 1980s. Retreating building trades 
unions clung to their strongholds in major urban centers in the 
Northeast, Midwest and West Coast, and watched nonunion 
contractors gobble up traditional union markets elsewhere. In 
some places, construction union locals are now little more than 
numbers in the telephone book. 
The construction unions' crisis both preceded and contributed 
to the general decline of organized labor. At the time "concessions" 
became a household word in manufacturing, building trades 
workers had already endured five years of wage freezes and cuts. 
Just as construction unions helped set standards in the past for 
wages, hours and political muscle for the entire labor movement, 
the rise of the open shop in construction was the opening salvo 
of an all-out assault on the house of labor in the 1970s and '80s. 
Since World War II, building trades unions generally marched 
to their own tune, cementing their power locally and nationally, 
and often appearing indifferent to the fate of other sectors of the 
workforce. But their current crisis has evaporated the reigning 
sense of complacency and has forced union leaders to reconsider 
adopting the traditions of militancy and activism that built their 
organizations a hundred years ago. Drawing on some of the recent 
innovations throughout the labor movement, building trades 
unions are currently more receptive to new initiatives than at any 
time in the past 50 years. 
The World of the Construction Worker 
Construction is one of the most visible of all industries. At one 
time or another, most people have watched the unfolding drama 
of a high-rise edging skyward, a house taking shape, a road nearing 
completion, or a bridge connecting two pieces of land. The people 
who create these structures carry out their daily tasks in plain 
view. Unlike the assembly-line operative tucked away in an 
industrially zoned factory or the office worker encased in a vertical 
glass box, the construction worker's movements can be monitored 
on a daily basis by "sidewalk superintendents." 
The high visibility of construction has produced an endless 
stream of popular images—from Lewis Hines' Depression-era 
photographs of heroic ironworkers erecting the Empire State 
Building, to the angry shots of pro-war hard hats in the late 1960s, 
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to the contemporary commercial portraits of sweating hunks 
enjoying their hard-earned Millertime. 
For all this visibility, construction remains a poorly understood 
industry. Surprisingly little has been written on the subject. In the 
absence of thoughtful analysis, the dominant stereotype of the 
construction worker—even among other unionists—remains that 
of an overpaid, underworked, narrow-minded, bigoted, rough-and-
tumble hard hat. 
In part, people within construction are responsible for this 
general lack of familiarity. It has always been a highly insular 
world, with its own set of rules, values and traditions, and with 
a highly developed "insider" vs. "outsider" point of view. 
Knowledge of the various trades was often passed from father to 
son, resulting in a workforce that continually recreated itself and 
was difficult to penetrate. The construction labor force was never 
particularly diverse. It has been, and still is, a white male preserve. 
Despite affirmative action efforts in the late 1970s, blacks and 
Hispanics each make up only 7%, and women just 2%, of the total 
workforce. 
Building trades workers tend to assume that their work is 
completely different from any other occupation. The shared 
exposure to danger, the terrifying insecurity of the boom-and-bust 
character of the business, and the physically demanding yet skilled 
nature of the work serve as powerful bonds between craft workers. 
For those who survive the initial years of adjustment, there is a 
sense of having entered a club that those on the outside can neither 
appreciate nor understand. 
In the global economy of the 1980s with its mammoth multi-
national corporate organizations, the building business is an 
anomaly. Giant contractors like Bechtel, Fluor Daniel, and Kellogg 
operate on an international scale, and even homebuilding has 
billion-dollar firms, but the persistence of a niche for local and 
regional builders is astonishing. Census figures track nearly a 
million "mom and pop" outfits that function without any 
employees, and 98% of the nation's construction firms retain fewer 
than 50 employees (on-site craft workers plus office support staff). 
Nor are the small builders on the margins of the industry. They 
employ fully 60% of the construction workforce. 
Construction workers certainly experience their work environ-
ment as decentralized. Workers focus on what the local market 
will bear as far as job security and pay scales are concerned, 
resulting in situations in which a union carpenter in New York 
City earns $30.66 in hourly wages and benefits while his Dallas 
counterpart makes just $16.22. Trades workers (particularly in the 
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union sector) move from contractor to contractor or follow 
building booms from region to region. In addition, many will, over 
the course of their working lives, dabble in self-employment. The 
option of throwing a toolbox in a pick-up truck and going it alone 
is always available, even if it is unlikely to bear much fruit. The 
chances of truly "making it" are increasingly remote, but the very 
possibility underpins a construction culture in which class identity 
and distinctions between employer and employed are sometimes 
blurred. 
Building is a treacherous way to make a living. The industry 
employs 5% of the U.S. labor force, but is responsible for 20% 
of all job-related fatalities. The rate of construction injuries and 
illnesses far outdistances any other industry. Above and beyond 
the obvious dangers of skyscraper construction and the unsafe 
working conditions that are standard on too many sites, day-to-
day life in the trades is no picnic. Tradespeople work in the 
blistering sun, biting cold and brackish muck, getting paid for only 
the hours and days the elements allow. 
For all the physical hardships, it is the psychological insecurity 
of uncertain employment that drives many people out of the 
trades. The boom-and-bust nature of the business means that no 
one can ever count on long-term security. Regional variations in 
job prospects are staggering, and the booms in any one area never 
last long. Today's plentiful jobs in the Northeast follow hard on 
the heels of near 60% construction unemployment ten years ago. 
Even in the best of times, the oasis of overtime in the summer 
often is not enough to compensate for the wasteland of the winter 
months. Building trades workers average eight or nine months a 
year of employment, reducing the impact of their comparatively 
high hourly wages to annual incomes more typical of manu-
facturing. 
The combination of a skilled labor force and a decentralized 
group of undercapitalized employers gave unionism an early 
foothold in construction. Individual builders did not have exten-
sive financial resources to crush strikes. Continuing progress on 
a job depended on the experience stored up in the hands and heads 
of the tradesmen. While late 19th Century builders tried all the 
standard operating procedures of American employers—blacklists, 
lockouts, strikebreakers—they were unable to inflict lasting 
damage. Building trades unions emerged as a permanent part of 
the construction landscape in the 1880s and 1890s. By World War 
I, it was a matter of common wisdom in many parts of the country 
that "a craftsman without a [union] card was a man without a 
trade." 
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The success of unionism was not just a matter of employer 
weakness. The chaotic nature of the business prompted far-sighted 
contractors to realize that unions could play a pivotal and positive 
role. With labor requirements varying wildly according to the 
individual job, season and cyclical condition, builders were hard-
pressed to maintain a stable body of employees. Since unions were 
prepared to handle the tasks of training (apprenticeship) and 
supplying labor (the hiring hall), employers ultimately agreed to 
exchange union recognition, the closed shop and relatively high 
wages for the freedom to hire and lay off as their business needs 
dictated. 
Despite numerous bitter strikes and periodic vicious open shop 
drives, this mutually agreeable arrangement guided construction 
labor relations from the beginning of the century until the early 
1970s. 
The Rise of the Open Shop 
The collective bargaining equilibrium that lasted 75 years disap-
peared in the last 20. A new and uneasy equilibrium seems to have 
set in, but it defines unions as a minority, not a dominant, force. 
And, though the unions have managed to slow the open shop 
juggernaut, there is no guarantee that the next recession will not 
inflict further damage. 
The roots of this transformation can be found in the spiraling 
construction costs of the 1960s. Inflationary pressures on materials 
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and labor set off alarms in the ranks of building owners, manage-
ment consultants, corporate editorialists, and public policy makers. 
In 1969, 200 of the nation's top chief executive officers formed 
the Construction Users Anti-Inflation Roundtable (now called the 
Business Roundtable) in order to put a lid on construction bills. 
Roundtable members included the heads of General Motors, 
General Electric, Exxon, U.S. Steel, DuPont and a variety of other 
corporate luminaries with sizable construction budgets. 
The perspective common to these forces was a desire to blunt 
union power. Most agreed with the hysterical analysis of a Fortune 
journalist who condemned the "murderous bargaining strength 
[of] the most powerful oligopoly in the American economy." In 
a widely distributed publication, the Roundtable sternly lectured 
building contractors on their inability to prevent unions from 
"usurping] the employer role normally reserved to management 
in other industries." The CEOs issued a series of 23 lengthy reports 
spelling out very specific methods to "restore the control that 
employers traditionally exercise." 
The heavyweights arrayed against the unions gained an impor-
tant ally in 1974—the most severe building recession in the post-
war era. Contractor business failures reached levels unseen since 
the Great Depression, and national construction unemployment 
hit 22% in May 1975. The jobless rate continued in double digits 
through the rest of the decade and into the early 1980s, peaking 
at 23% in October 1982. Building picked up slightly after 1982, 
but the devastation of the previous eight years had a chilling effect 
on bargaining. 
Nonunion contractors had taken advantage of their lower labor 
costs to underbid their unionized competitors for the shrinking 
number of jobs during the recession. In turn, union builders 
pointed to the open shop threat to justify severe and sweeping 
concessions. 
In 1984, union electricians in Seattle and surburban Los Angeles, 
carpenters in Atlanta and Denver, and plumbers in Arizona all 
took pay cuts in the range of $5 an hour. In Houston contractors 
won a wage freeze in 1983, a 15% cut in 1984, and then demanded 
another 15% cut the following year. Paul Dobson of the Houston 
Carpenters District Council complained, "We've done everything 
but give them our shoes and socks." While some of the worst 
concessions of 1983-84 are slowly being won back, the bargaining 
outlook continues to be discouraging. From 1982 to the present, 
the average annual wage-and-fringe increase has never risen above 
2.5%—well below the average annual increase of nearly 4% in the 
cost of living during those years. 
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Political access and influence has accompanied the growth of 
the nonunion sector. ABC representatives actively lobby against 
legal protections for construction workers. The principal item on 
their legislative agenda has been the elimination of the Davis-
Bacon Act, a Depression-era law that requires federally funded 
construction jobs to be paid at the "prevailing rate" in the 
designated area. While Congressional supporters of the ABC have 
not been able to eliminate the law, they have written highly 
restrictive amendments in the past few years. The ABC also has 
led successful campaigns in seven states to repeal "mini Davis-
Bacon" laws—legislation that requires payment of the prevailing 
wage on state- and city-funded projects. 
Today, the field of contracting no longer includes just union and 
nonunion builders. A new hybrid called the "double-breasted" 
firm—a single company with a union and a nonunion arm—has 
appeared. In smaller operations, nonunion counterparts of union 
builders are seldom more than bare-bones corporations listed in 
a relative's name. Office space, equipment, and even payrolls 
overlap. Superintendents rush back and forth from union to non-
union jobs, while company drivers casually place magnetic signs 
with the nonunion name over the union logo painted on their 
trucks. The practice has made a mockery of union agreements. 
In an area that is still largely unionized, a contractor will bid on 
a job with his union firm; in settings where the unions are weak, 
he will use his nonunion name. 
Amazingly, this arrangement has won legal sanction as long as 
a "maximum separation of operations" exists between the two 
entities. In practice, this technical nicety is usually overlooked. 
A House Subcommittee report labelled NLRB rulings on double-
breasting "virtually a blueprint for the avoidance of lawful 
collective bargaining agreements." By now, double-breasting exists 
up and down the line in construction. In 1984, eight of the nation's 
top ten contractors were double-breasted. 
The general anti-labor political climate, the recession and lower 
labor costs may have provided a window of opportunity for the 
open shop movement, but in the final analysis corporate subsidies 
proved to be the crucial gateway to success. Under the protective 
wing of the Roundtable and its allies, nonunion firms were handed 
projects of increasingly significant scale. Roundtable firms such 
as DuPont and Dow Chemical went so far as to adopt policies that 
actually barred union contractors from bidding on their projects. 
Open shop spokesmen have long acknowledged that their 
expansion was aided tremendously by political and corporate 
sponsorship. 
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The Open Shop and the Changing Nature of Building 
Nonunion contractors have always been frank about their aims. 
They intend to reduce wages, weaken established working condi-
tions, eliminate jurisdictional divisions, and lower expectations 
of a safe working environment. What many people, including 
some within the construction unions, have not grasped is that the 
open shop challenge extends to the way workers work. 
ABC leaders have a vision of an industry that is more in tune 
with standard business practices, one that replaces a relatively 
egalitarian and collective workforce based on a common commit-
ment to craft pride with a conventional hierarchical division of 
labor. The open shop vision dovetails with recent technological 
and organizational changes in the industry. 
Automation is not relentlessly marching onto the job site, as it 
is in auto and steel. But prefabrication and specialization have 
transformed construction management techniques and the daily 
experience of the trades worker. The craft worker's traditional 
identity as a fabricator is gradually giving way to a new role as 
installer. Preassembled materials and modular components 
simplify the process of construction. Multi-story, factory-built 
homes can now be shipped on trucks to the site, complete with 
lighting and plumbing fixtures, appliances, hardware and a coat 
of paint. Even on conventionally built projects, units that were 
formerly put together on site, such as doors and windows, typically 
arrive prefinished. More and more of the highly skilled tasks once 
central to on-site construction are now performed in factories with 
the standard industrial division of labor. 
In recent years, individual crafts have been fragmented into a 
series of subspecialties. Being an "all-around mechanic" is helpful, 
but no longer necessary to earn a living. For example, carpenters 
are trained as either concrete form, framing, drywall, ceiling, floor, 
door, cabinet or hardware installers. Many contractors actually 
prefer employees with limited training on the assumption that the 
specialized worker can perform his/her particular task with greater 
efficiency. 
These changes affect both the union and nonunion sectors of 
the industry. But open shop builders have welcomed and promoted 
these developments more aggressively. ABC training programs are 
either nonexistent or six-week modules of highly specialized 
instruction, geared for the new semiskilled building mechanic in 
a way that the generalist four-year union apprenticeship programs 
are not. While spokesmen for the open shop often acknowledge 
that skill levels among union building trades workers are higher, 
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they argue that this disparity is " | ^ 
not particularly significant in a 
construction industry less 
dependent on extensive craft 
knowledge. 
For union and nonunion con-
tractor alike, the adoption of 
prefabrication and task special-
ization is motivated by a desire 
to cut costs and boost produc-
tivity. But open shop employers 
have a greater ideological as 
well as economic incentive to 
support a reorganized industry. 
The nonhierarchical structure 
of union construction—all jour-
neymen in a given craft receive 
the identical wage—is anathema 
to nonunion ideologues. Open 
shop firms typically hire a few 
experienced and relatively 
well-paid trades workers to oversee a number of unskilled, poorly 
paid 18- to 25-year-olds. "That's the way it should be," remarks 
ABC's Stephen Tocco. "You don't need a brain surgeon to know 
how to frame or put forms together. That's what American produc-
tivity and American business is all about." 
The Union Response: Concessions 
The meteoric growth of the open shop initially caught union 
leaders by surprise. Their unions had essentially run on automatic 
pilot through the prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s. Local union 
business agents defined their responsibilities to include little more 
than referring members to job sites, managing the books, and 
negotiating periodic contracts. Tasks such as internal education, 
organizing, and demonstrations of solidarity with other sectors 
of the labor movement—once rich traditions in a number of the 
building trades unions—fell by the wayside. 
Many union officials initially refused to recognize the severity 
of the crisis in the hope that the decline in fortunes was a 
temporary aberration. But as the open shop grabbed more and 
more longstanding union markets, union leaders reluctantly 
acknowledged their problems would not disappear. 
The success of the post-war construction jobs machine had 
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prompted union officials to identify their own success with the 
prospects and perspectives of the employers. When the situation 
soured, officials continued to turn to industry spokesmen for 
answers. Having abandoned an independent labor-developed 
viewpoint, they were reduced to parrotting an industry-defined 
agenda. In an editorial in a 1982 issue of his union's magazine, 
Operating Engineers President J.C. Turner hailed a Gulf Oil 
executive's statement condemning repeated strikes, jurisdictional 
disputes, long coffee breaks, excessive absenteeism, tardiness, and 
leaving the job early. 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the unions' 
first calculated response involved establishing joint bodies with 
union contractors that relied heavily on the contractors' analysis 
of the situation. In 1982 the AFL-CIO's Building and Construction 
Trades Department (BCTD) and the National Construction 
Employers Council (NCEC) agreed to establish a Market Recovery 
Program for Union Construction. Market recovery programs 
aimed to reverse the decline of union construction by boosting 
the quality and reliability of union contractors. Each area's 
program was autonomous, but most eventually evolved in 
common directions. For example, the stated goal of Philadelphia's 
Operation MARCH was: "to make union contractors more 
competitive. . . through increased productivity, increased 
efficiency and cost containment." Like many of the other 
programs, Operation MARCH used the Business Roundtable 
reports as guidelines. 
The initial stabs at organizing followed a similar path. Multi-
trade organizing projects were set up in Los Angeles and Houston. 
The Carpenters developed Operation Turnaround. But, as 
Carpenters organizer Jim Parker announced, the emphasis was 
on "trying to make union contractors that we have more compe-
titive" through the prevention of strikes and the elimination of 
restrictive work rules. In practice, making contractors more 
competitive inevitably translated into wage concessions. The rank-
and-file perception that "organizing" was just a screen for "con-
cessions" was so common that the Carpenter felt obliged to 
publish a critical letter from the wife of a member. She complained 
that the union was doing her husband no good by asking him to 
forego a pay raise or accept a pay cut to stay on the job. "That's 
not turning anything around," she commented. 
On the national level, the BCTD adopted a strategy of developing 
model project agreements to be signed directly with owners of 
massive construction projects. The plan was to adopt uniform 
working conditions binding on all local trades for the life of the 
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project. Once again, concessions built into the agreements 
provided the attraction for the owner. 
Despite some successes, the outcome of the early project 
agreements was largely dismal. For example, in July 1983 the 
BCTD signed an agreement to cover all industrial work in the 
Houston area. The contract stipulated that all trades workers be 
paid 80% of union scale and that fully 40% of the workforce be 
made up of apprentices and a new category termed "subjourney-
men." These classifications of workers could receive as little as 
one-half of the union scale. The concessions granted in the 
Houston pact were intended to appeal to industrial users who 
might otherwise have built their projects nonunion. By October 
1983, less than three months after the agreement was signed, it 
became clear that the pact was worthless. No union jobs had 
materialized, and one of the main targets, Exxon, had awarded 
a $500 million project to a nonunion contractor. BCTD President 
Robert Georgine concluded bitterly: "We may have been used as 
a tool to force down the bids of the open shop contractors." 
These experiments with concession bargaining generally proved 
fruitless. At best, they preserved some jobs at lower wages. At 
worst, they lowered pay without any effect on the proportion of 
jobs that went to union workers. Union contractors profited from 
the reduced wages and nonunion builders followed suit. Since 
open shop employers typically set their wages in relation to the 
union scale, extensive concessions had the effect of reducing the 
standard of living of all construction workers, union and nonunion. 
Union Response: Taking the Offensive 
"We have made concession after concession, and every year we 
have been getting a smaller and smaller piece of the pie/' Georgine 
remarked bitterly in a speech to a union contractors' association 
last year. His comments reflected a growing realization inside 
union halls that concessions had produced little or no gains in the 
union share of the construction job market. While the official 
desire to work hand-in-hand with union contractors has not 
diminished, there appears to be a shift in strategy to a more 
aggressive approach toward nonunion builders. 
In the past few years, building trades unions have moved to 
reassert their traditional political clout and have experimented 
with a variety of tactics more often associated with the new breed 
of labor officials and organizers in the manufacturing and service 
sectors of the economy. High-powered legislative lobbying, 
increased political endorsements, the use of economic leverage, 
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corporate campaigns, and most importantly, a new orientation 
towards organizing are all now part and parcel of the standard 
rhetoric of building trades union leaders. Whether or not these 
approaches are used varies widely from union to union and region 
to region, but they are no longer foreign concepts. 
Political Activity 
Since the McGovern candidacy of 1972, the building trades 
unions have returned to the folds of the Democratic Party. Union 
PACs contribute heavily to local and national candidates who are 
most often identified with the moderate-to-liberal wing of the 
party. While top construction union officers still tend to support 
conservative foreign policies, sympathy to labor has far outpaced 
anti-Communism as the crucial litmus test for political support. 
President Ford's unexpected veto of the situs picketing bill in 1976 
shocked the building trades leadership out of their complacent 
assumption that they could buttonhole friends in both Republican 
and Democratic corridors of power. 
Priority items on the trades' legislative agenda now include 
safety issues, prevailing wage laws, and the elimination of double-
breasting. The record is mixed. While labor lobbyists have, of 
necessity, been on the defensive in the Reagan years, construction 
unions have managed to fend off the most severe attacks on OSHA 
and the Davis-Bacon Act, and they may be closing in on Congres-
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sional passage of an anti-double-breasting measure. 
Pension Funds 
The publication of Rifkin and Barber's The North Will Rise 
Again in 1978 alerted the labor movement to the untapped power 
of union pension funds. The lesson was not lost on construction 
unions. 
Assigned to money managers and investment counselors, stag-
gering sums—today nearly $60 billion in the building trades 
alone—had been ignored in unsupervised investments. The 
frequent use of union pension funds to finance nonunion construc-
tion projects prompted Dennis Walton, business rep of Operating 
Engineers Local 675 in south Florida, to charge: "We've been 
loaning the bastards money to build us out of a job." The high 
degree of control exercised by unions in construction pension 
funds (far greater than unions have in other industries) offered 
the possibility of extensive economic leverage. With Walton paving 
the way, union funds in California, Massachusetts and a number 
of other areas across the country have financed construction 
projects built 100% union. 
The Carpenters, for example, can now track the application of 
their pension funds across the country. Through a computerized 
system, they can identify financial institutions supported by the 
funds that may be involved in construction projects. As 
shareholders, they can legitimately raise concerns about job-site 
conditions. The Sheet Metal Workers have explored direct usage 
of their pension funds. Last year, they invested $13 million in a 
photovoltaic panel manufacturing plant, on the assumption that 
solar technology will be the basis of future jobs for their 
membership. 
The Carpenters Union in Massachusetts has taken a further step 
to control their financial affairs. Backed by their swelling pension 
and annuity funds, the Carpenters established the federally 
chartered First Trade Union Savings Bank in 1987. While federal 
laws set strict limits on banking policy, the bank can offer lenient 
loan guidelines to union members, and it plans to use bank capital 
to underwrite union-built affordable housing in Boston's minority 
community. This housing proposal parallels the highly successful 
entry of Boston's Bricklayers Union into the union-built affordable 
housing arena. 
Corporate Campaigns 
In 1985 the BCTD signed a project agreement to ensure that 
General Motors employed only union construction labor on its 
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Saturn plant in an area of Tennessee that was 95% nonunion. 
Chrysler accepted similar terms on a $65 million electronic parts 
manufacturing facility in Alabama. When Toyota announced plans 
to erect an $800 million factory in Georgetown, Kentucky, the 
BCTD moved to develop one more pact. Toyota ignored the union 
offer, prompting Georgine to opt for a strategy rarely employed 
in the building trades—the corporate campaign. 
The 1986 campaign against Toyota targetted the automaker at 
a variety of vulnerable points. The BCTD ordered all local building 
trades unions to adopt a policy of noncooperation. Since many 
open shop contractors use some union labor on their projects (such 
as crane operators), this move eliminated a potential source of 
labor. The Kentucky Building Trades filed motions challenging the 
legality of aid granted to the project by the Kentucky legislature. 
In Washington, union legislative agents sought Congressional 
support to overturn tax law provisions helpful to Toyota. And, 
Building Trades Councils in a number of cities mobilized highly 
visible mass demonstrations. 
The steady pressure produced an agreement after six months. 
In explaining the shift in policy, Ohbayashi, Toyota's construction 
manager, complained that its executives had spent more time 
fighting the corporate campaign than preparing to build the plant. 
With the Toyota campaign successfully resolved, a California 
battle has assumed national prominence. For the last year and a 
half, construction workers in Contra Costa County have fought 
to overturn USS-POSCO's award of a $350 million steel plant 
expansion to a nonunion contractor. The giant factory is the largest 
nonunion project in the history of California. 
Particularly galling is the choice of contractor—BE&K. Not only 
is BE&K one of the nation's largest open shop builders and a spear-
carrier for the ABC's anti-union vendetta; the company has also 
expanded outside the construction business to provide 
strikebreakers as a professional service to anti-union corporations. 
This modern-day Pinkerton maintains a computerized database 
of 5,000 workers who are experienced in crossing picket lines. 
International Paper's current vendetta against the Paperworkers 
Union has been bolstered by an army of replacement workers 
from BE&K. 
The California campaign shows few signs of letting up. On 
March 19, 10,000 people rallied near the plant site. The demon-
stration elicited a much broader range of endorsements than the 
standard building trades "go-it-alone" activity. Marchers were 
recruited from a cross-section of AFL-CIO unions, and presidential 
candidate Jesse Jackson appeared as one of the principal speakers. 
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The corporate campaign strategy has taught the building trades 
unions important lessons in political organizing. A multi-pronged 
attack on an employer moves attention away from an exclusive 
focus on the workplace and inevitably brings organizers into 
contact with other interests and constituencies. The Carpenters, 
for example, have developed an ongoing alliance with the Paper-
workers to coordinate activities against their common enemy, 
BE&K. And the decision to invite Jackson to the California rally 
is another important, if still unusual, step in moving out of the 
construction cocoon and into an arena with activists outside the 
labor movement. Many construction union officials are still 
profoundly uncomfortable in issue-oriented coalitions, but a 
growing number realize that labor's general vulnerability makes 
new alliances imperative. 
Organizing 
At a 1977 convention, an AFL-CIO official remarked to a 
reporter that so little organizing took place in construction that 
"if you ask the 17 unions how to do it, you will get 17 different 
answers." In the prosperous 1950s and 1960s, union leaders 
ignored trades workers outside their ranks, preferring to assure 
relatively stable employment through limits on membership size. 
Whatever organizing did occur was of the ' 'top-down'' variety— 
that is, convincing employers to sign a union contract. Bottom-up 
organizing, a brand of organizing that is routine in other industries, 
was abandoned. While many people in the rest of the labor 
movement readily assume the trades had never organized the 
unorganized, in fact it was standard practice among the founding 
fathers of building trades unionism. John Cogill, an early 
Carpenters business agent, spoke for the vast majority of early 
Brotherhood leaders when he said in 1912: "every man that works 
with carpenters' tools must be brought into the union." 
The official attachment to top-down organizing and the reluc-
tance to embrace bottom-up organizing cannot be simply 
attributed to post-war complacency. Organizing in construction 
is very difficult. Unlike potential bargaining units permanently 
ensconced in factory or office settings, a typical building 
employer's workforce is small and transient. Tradespeople shift 
from site to site, company to company, and city to city. Even on 
the largest sites, a full-blown organizing campaign with card-
signings and NLRB elections would almost invariably take longer 
than the life of the project. 
There is another reason that building trades officials, particularly 
on the local level, resist grassroots organizing. Given the economic 
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insecurity of construction, rank-and-file union members hesitate 
to welcome unlimited numbers of new members. In an industry 
with no provisions for seniority, older union members frequently 
conclude that restricting membership is the only road to job 
protection. 
As understandable as the restrictive point of view may be, it 
has proved disastrously counterproductive in the current era of 
the open shop. Many qualified nonunion trades workers know the 
building trades unions only as institutions that have barred them. 
Thus, even the local unions that muster the courage to mount 
genuine bottom-up organizing campaigns must overcome hostility 
from the people they hope to organize. "You don't want me, you 
just want the work" is a standard comment hurled at building 
trades organizers. Given their limited bottom-up organizing exper-
ience and lukewarm membership backing, few organizers are able 
to overcome both nonunion worker skepticism and union member 
fears while waging a difficult campaign against an anti-union 
employer. 
A number of unions have beefed up organizing departments in 
their national offices. Joint efforts, such as Atlanta's Project 
Phoenix, represent a shift from joint labor-management initiatives 
to strictly union-based programs. At a rally in 1983 in Atlanta, 
Michael Lucas, organizing director of the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), told 700 assembled 
trades workers that their unions need to "turn back the clock" 
and "take a look at what the people did who built our unions." 
Lucas is the most widely known advocate of grassroots organ-
izing within the building trades, but other unions are making 
similar efforts. The Carpenters are beginning to experiment with 
the bottom-up approach by targetting nonunion carpenters in 
selected areas. In some areas, the Sheet Metal Workers require 
apprentices to spend one year after graduation as union organizers. 
These programs may all be in their infancy, but they offer hopeful 
new directions. 
The jury is still out. Supporters and opponents can each point 
to examples of success and failure to bolster their positions. The 
truth is that until grassroots organizing is given the same kind of 
resources and political commitment expended on other initiatives, 
its potential will be unknown. What is clear is that decades of 
closed doors and restrictive regulations have not prevented a 
devastating weakening of construction unions. They have, on the 
other hand, bred hostility among nonunion trades workers, 
minorities, and other groups who have been the victims of exclu-
sionary union policies. 
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Organizing the Future 
The future direction of the trades rests on organizing the new 
workforce. If no major changes occur in the near future, union 
members can reasonably expect to continue to account for one-
third of the construction dollar. The vast nonunion workforce will 
remain outside the ranks of unionism unless a more aggressive 
direction is plotted. 
Successful organizing will require a combination of top-down 
and bottom-up organizing. The traditional approach should not 
be eliminated. Union advocates can still point to the advantages 
available to contractors using union labor—the high level of skills, 
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greater productivity and the large pool of experienced labor. 
However, a strategy based solely on wooing contractors will never 
appreciably dent the open shop movement, a group of employers 
that has powerful ideological as well as economic reasons to resist 
unionism. 
Unionism must be brought directly to the workforce. But 
bottom-up campaigns will require some major adjustments for 
union officials. They will have to recognize that the psychology 
and work experience of nonunion trades workers, particularly the 
younger ones, may be different than that of present union 
members. 
The feeling of craft pride and a sense that union membership 
was a badge of craft competence were once the glue that bonded 
organized craftsmen. These appeals will no longer function as 
effectively with a body of workers who are less skilled and semi-
industrial in nature. Organizers now have to operate in an industry 
in transition and therefore must tailor their messages to workers 
with widely differing levels of skills, expectations of job security, 
and long-term commitment to the industry. 
Construction unions need to loosen restrictions and crack open 
their doors. This applies to the internal life of the union as well 
as outside. Since business agents are often in a position of referring 
workers to jobs, their political power is augmented by the 
economic control they hold over members' lives. As a result, 
internal democracy has not always flourished in post-war building 
trades unionism. This has had the effect of reducing participation 
in union activities and creating a large body of members who pay 
dues as a pro forma matter. Successful bottom-up organizing 
depends, to some degree, on an effective mobilization of existing 
members as resources for and supporters of union campaigns. 
Outside the union hall, the building trades have to continue to 
close ranks with the rest of the labor movement and build 
coalitions beyond. It will take joint efforts with community, 
minority, women's and civic organizations to tap the residual pro-
labor sympathies tarnished by the building trades unions' exclu-
sionary reputation. The alternative is the permanent acceptance 
of the present equilibrium—or worse. 
In a recent ABC advertising supplement, Charles Brown of 
DuPont and the Business Roundtable looked back at the last 20 
years: "The construction industry was monopolized by the union 
segment with no apparent alternative in sight. Fortunately for all 
of us, the capitalistic system worked again. Tree market' forces 
prevailed.'' 
In fact, the open shop has not yet prevailed. It has, however, 
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redefined the nature of the industry and the role of unions in it. 
The future position of labor organizations in the building trades 
rests on union willingness to shed outdated assumptions and 
practices, to reassess the new conditions that operate in the 
industry, and to exchange a policy of exclusion for one of inclusion. 
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